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Abstract
The topic of provable deep neural network robustness has raised con-
siderable interest in recent years. Most research has focused on adversarial
robustness, which studies the robustness of perceptive models in the neigh-
bourhood of particular samples. However, other works have proved global
properties of smaller neural networks. Yet, formally verifying perception
remains uncharted. This is due notably to the lack of relevant properties
to verify, as the distribution of possible inputs cannot be formally speci-
fied. We propose to take advantage of the simulators often used either to
train machine learning models or to check them with statistical tests, a
growing trend in industry. Our formulation allows us to formally express
and verify safety properties on perception units, covering all cases that
could ever be generated by the simulator, to the difference of statistical
tests which cover only seen examples. Along with this theoretical formu-
lation, we provide a tool to translate deep learning models into standard
logical formulae. As a proof of concept, we train a toy example mimick-
ing an autonomous car perceptive unit, and we formally verify that it will
never fail to capture the relevant information in the provided inputs.
1 Introduction
Recent years have shown a considerable interest in designing “more robust”
deep learning models. In classical software safety, asserting the robustness of a
program usually consists in checking if the program respects a given specifica-
tion. Various techniques can output a sound answer whether the specification
is respected or not, provided it is sufficiently formally formulated. However,
the deep learning field is different, since the subject of verification (the deep
learning model) is actually obtained through a learning algorithm, which is not
tailored to satisfy a specification by construction. In this paper, we will denote
as ”program” the deep learning model that is the result of a learning procedure.
Such a program aims to perform a certain task, such as image classification,
using statistical inference. For this, it is trained through a learning algorithm,
usually involving a loss minimization by gradient descent over its parameters.
This way, in most deep learning applications, there exists no formal specification
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of what the program should achieve at the end of the learning phase: instead,
the current dominant paradigm in statistical learning consists in learning an
estimator that approximates a probability distribution, about which little is
known. Failures of learning procedures, such as overfitting, are hard to quantify
and describe in the form of a specification.
A particular flaw of deep learning, namely adversarial examples, has been the
subject of intensive research [37, 10, 30, 21]. Recently, the quest for provable
adversarial robustness has been bringing together the machine learning and
formal methods communities. New tools are written, inspired by decades of
work in software safety, opening new perspectives on formal verification for
deep learning. However, the bulk of these works has focused on the specific issue
of adversarial robustness. Apart from well-defined environments where strong
prior information exists on the input space (see [23]), little work has been made
on formulating and certifying specific properties of deep neural networks.
The goal of this work is to propose a framework for the general problem
of deep learning verification that will allow the formulation of new properties
to be checked, while still benefiting from the efforts of the formal methods
community towards more efficient verification tools. We aim to leverage the
techniques developed for adversarial robustness and extend the scope of deep
learning verification to working on global properties. Specifically, we focus on a
still unexplored avenue: models trained on simulated data, commonplace in the
automotive industry. Our contribution is twofold: we first propose a formal-
ism to express formal properties on deep perception units trained on simulated
data; secondly we present an open source tool that directly translates machine
learning models into a logical formula that can be used to soundly verify these
properties, hence ensuring some formal guarantees. Recent work proposed to
analyse programs trained on simulators [15]. Although their motivations are
similar to ours, they work on abstract feature spaces without directly consider-
ing the perception unit, and they rely on sampling techniques while we aim to
use sound, exhaustive techniques. Their aim is to exhibit faulty behaviour in
some type of neural network controllers, while we can formally verify any type
of perception unit.
The paper is structured as follows: We first describe our formulation of the
problem of verification of machine learning models trained on simulated data.
We then describe the translator tools, and detail its main features. Finally, we
present as a first use case a synthetic toy ’autonomous vehicle’ problem. We
conclude by presenting the next issues to tackle.
2 Related work
2.1 Adversarial robustness: a local property
Adversarial perturbations are small variations of a given example that have been
crafted so that the network misclassifies the resulting noisy example, called an
adversarial example. More formally, given a sample x0 in a set X , a classi-
fication function C : x ∈ X → Rd, a distortion amplitude ε > 0 and a dis-
tance metric ‖.‖p, a neural network is locally ε-robust if for all perturbations δ
s.t. ‖δ‖p 6 ε, C(x0) = C(x0+δ). To provably assert adversarial robustness of
a network, the goal is then to find the exact minimal distortion ε. Note that this
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property is local, tied to sample x0. A global adversarial robustness property
could be phrased as: A deep neural network is globally ε-robust if for any pair
of samples (x1, x2) ∈ X 2 s.t. ‖x1 − x2‖p 6 ε, C(x1) = C(x2). Verifying this
global property is intractable, thus all the work has focused on local adversarial
robustness.
Since their initial discovery in [37], adversarial examples became a widely
researched topic. New ways to generate adversarial examples were proposed
[10, 25, 41], as well as defenses [1, 26]. Other works focus on studying the
theory behind adversarial examples. While the initial work [18] suggests that
adversarial examples are a result of a default in the training procedure, “bugs”,
recent investigations ([17, 21, 34]) suggest that (at least part of the) adversarial
examples may be inherently linked to the design principles of deep learning and
to their resulting effects on programs: using any input features available to de-
crease the loss function, including “non robust” features that are exploited by
adversarial examples generation algorithms. It is important to note that their
very existence may be tied with the fact that we employ deep neural network on
highly-dimensional perceptual spaces such as images, where we witness counter-
intuitive behaviours. In any case, their imperceptibility for humans and their
capacity to transfer between networks and datasets [30] make them a poten-
tially dangerous phenomenon regarding safety and security. For example, an
autonomous car sensor unit could be fooled by a malicious agent to output false
direction in order to cause accidents.
2.2 Proving global properties in non-perceptual space
It is possible to express formal properties in simpler settings than adversarial
robustness. By simpler, we mean two main differences: (i) the dimensionality of
the input is much lower than in typical perception cases, where most of adver-
sarial examples occur, and (ii) the problem the program aims to solve provides
an explicit description of the meaning of the inputs and outputs, making a for-
mulation of safety property much simpler. Rephrased otherwise, the program
is working on inputs whose semantics is (at least partially) defined. Since deep
neural networks use simple programming concepts (e.g., no loops), it is quite
easy to translate them directly to a standard verification format, such as SMT-
LIB [5]. Provided the inputs are sufficiently well defined, it is then possible to
encode safety properties as relationships between inputs and outputs, such as
inequality constraints on real values.
An example of such setting can be seen in the Anti Collision Avoidance
System for Unmanned aircrafts (ACAS-Xu) [27]. Inputs correspond to aircraft
sensors, and outputs to airplane commands. In such case, specifications can
be directly encoded as a set of constraints on the inputs and outputs. In [23],
the authors proposed an implementation of ACAS-Xu as a deep neural network,
and they were able to formally prove that their program respected various safety
properties.
It is important to note that the inputs of the program are here high-level in-
formation (existence of an intruder together with its position), which completely
bypasses the problem of perception (as airplanes have direct access to this infor-
mation, in a low-level form, through their sensors, and through communications
with ground operators).
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2.3 Tools for provable deep learning robustness
Critical systems perform operations whose failure may cause physical harm or
great economical loss. A self-driving car is a critical system: failure of embedded
software may cause harm, as seen in accidents such as [19]. In the automobile
industry, one expects the airbag to resist to a given pressure, the tires to last
for a lower-bounded duration, etc. As software is more and more ubiquitous in
vehicles, it is natural to have high expectations for software safety as well. An
attempt to meet these expectations makes use of formal methods. This gen-
eral term describes a variety of techniques that aim to provide mathematically
sound guarantees with respect to a given specification. In less than a decade,
an impressive amount of research was undertaken to bring formal verification
knowledge and tools to the field of adversarial robustness. Deep learning verifi-
cation has developed tools coming from broadly two different sets of techniques;
this taxonomy is borrowed from [9].
The first set is the family of exact verification methods, such as Satisfiabil-
ity Modulo Theory [6]. SMT solvers perform automated reasoning on logical
formulae, following a certain set of rules (a logic) on specific entities (integers,
reals, arrays, etc.) described by a theory. An SMT problem consists in decid-
ing whether, for a given formula, there exists an instantiation of the variables
that makes the formula true. Programs properties and control flow are encoded
as logical formulae, that specialized SMT solvers try to solve. It is possible
to express precise properties, but since most SMT solvers try to be exhaustive
over the search space, a careful formulation of the constraints and control flow
is necessary to keep the problem tractable. It was formally proven in [23] that
solving a verification problem composed of conjunction of clauses by explicit enu-
meration for a feedforward network is NP-hard. However, the NP-hardness of a
problem does not prevent us from designing solving schemes. In this same work,
the authors introduced ReLuPlex, a modified solver and simplex algorithm, that
lazily evaluates ReLUs, reducing the need to branch on non-linearities. Their
follow-up work [24] improves and extends the tool to support more complex
networks and network-level reasoning. Others [9] rephrase the problem of ad-
versarial robustness verification as a branch-and-bound problem and provide a
solid benchmark to compare current and future algorithms on piece-wise linear
networks. Other exact techniques are based on mixed integer linear program-
ming (MILP). The verification of adversarial robustness properties on piece-wise
linear networks can indeed be formulated as a MILP problem [38], and a pre-
conditioning technique drastically reduces the number of necessary calculations.
Adversarial robustness properties were thus checked on ResNets (a very deep
architecture) with l∞-bounded perturbations on CIFAR-10.
The second set of techniques in formal methods is based on overapproxi-
mating the program’s behaviour. Indeed, since solving the exact verification
problem is hard, some authors worked on computing a lower bound of ε, using
techniques building overapproximations of the program, on which it is easier to
verify properties. Abstract interpretation (first introduced in [12]) is an exam-
ple of such technique. It is a mathematical framework aiming to prove sound
properties on abstracted semantics of program. In this framework, a program’s
concrete executions are abstracted onto less precise, but more computationally
tractable abstract executions, using numerical domains. Finding numerical do-
mains that balance expressiveness, accuracy and calculation footprint is one of
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the key challenges of abstract interpretation.
The first instance of specifically-tailored deep learning verification described
how to refine non-linear sigmoid activation function to help verification [32]. [40]
proposes an outer convex envelop for ReLu classifiers with linear constraints,
expressing the robustness problem as a Linear Programming (LP) problem. [29]
and [35] propose a framework for building abstract interpretations of neural net-
works, which they use to derive a tight upper bound on robustness for various
architectures and for regularization. On MNIST, both works displayed a robust-
ness of 97% bounded by a l∞ = 0.1 perturbation. On CIFAR-10, they achieved
a 50% robustness for a similar net with a l∞ = 0.006 perturbation. Symbolic
calculus on neural networks is performed in [39], allowing symbolic analysis and
outperforming previous methods. A verification framework based on bounding
ReLu networks with linear functions is proposed in [8].
The boundary between these two families of techniques can be blurry, and
both techniques can be combined. For instance, [36] combines overapproxima-
tion and MILP techniques to provide tighter bounds on exact methods. Com-
peting with complete methods, they verify a hard property on ACAS-Xu faster
and provide precise bounds faster than other methods.
All these techniques are employed either for proving local properties (local
adversarial robustness), or on simpler, non perceptual input spaces. On the op-
posite, our work proposes a framework to prove global properties on perceptual
inputs.
3 CAMUS: a new formalism to specify and ver-
ify machine learning models
3.1 Motivation
In most deep learning application domains, such as image classification [20], ob-
ject detection [11], control learning [7], speech recognition [33], or style transfer
[22], there exists no formal definition of the input. Let us consider the software
of an autonomous car as an example. A desirable property would be not to run
over pedestrians. This property can be split in i) all pedestrians are detected,
and ii) all detected pedestrians are avoided. For a formal certification, the
property should be expressed in the form “For any image containing pedestri-
ans, whatever the weather conditions or camera angle could be, all pedestrians
present in that image are detected and avoided”. Such a formulation supposes
one is able to describe the set of all possible images containing pedestrians (to-
gether with their location). However, there exists no exact characterization of
what a pedestrian is or looks like, and certainly not one that takes into account
weather condition, camera angle, input type or light conditions. Any handmade
characterization or model would be very tiresome to build, and still incomplete.
On the upside, machine learning has demonstrated its ability to make use of
data that cannot be formally specified, yielding impressive results in all above-
mentioned application domains, among others; on the downside, it has also been
demonstrated that ML models can easily fail dramatically, for instance when
attacked with adversarial examples. Thus, manufacturers of critical systems
need to provide elements that allow regulators, contractors and end-users to
trust the systems in which they embed their software.
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Usually, car manufacturers rely on test procedures to measure their system’s
performances and safety properties. But testing can, at best, yield statistical
bounds on the absence of failures: The efficiency of a system against a particular
situation is not assessed before this situation is actually met during a real-world
experiment. As the space of possible situations is enormous (possibly infinite)
and incidents are rare events, one cannot assess that an autonomous vehicle will
be safe in every situation by relying on physical tests alone.
A current remedy is to use artificial data, and to augment the actual data
with data generated by a simulation software, with several benefits: Removing
the need to collect data with expensive and time consuming tests in the real
world; Making it possible to generate potentially hazardous scenarios precisely,
e.g., starting with the most common crash cases. Examples of such simulators
are Carla [14] and the NVIDIA Drive Constellation system. However, even if it
is possible to artificially generate corner cases more easily, the space of possible
scenarios is still enormous, and some accidents remain completely unpredictable
a priori by human test designers. For instance, in a recent car accident involving
partially self-driving technology, the manufacturer admitted that the camera
failed to distinguish a white truck against a bright sky [19], causing the death
of the driver. Such a test case is difficult to come up with for a human, because
it is the conjunction of specific environmental conditions and specific driving
conditions.
Our motivation is to bring an additional layer of trust, not relying on statis-
tical arguments, but rather on formal guarantees. Our long term objective is to
be able to formalize a specification and to provide guarantees on every possible
scenario, automatically finding violations of the specification. Because practi-
tioners are now relying more and more on simulators, we propose as a first step
to study such simulated setting, and to formalize it. The idea is to rephrase the
verification problem in order to include both the deep learning model and the
simulator software within the verification problem. As said earlier, a simulator
offers more control on the learning data by providing explicit parameters (for
instance: number and positions of pedestrians on the image).
3.2 Problem formulation and notations
Let f : X → Y be an algorithm taking a perceptual input x ∈ X and yielding
a decision y ∈ Y. The perceptual space X will typically be of the form Rd or
[0, 1]d. In the general framework of this work, f is a program trained with a
learning procedure on a finite subset of X to perform a specific task (e.g., drive
the passengers safely home). In our example, the task would be to output a
command from an image, in which case, for a given image x, f(x) would be the
driving action taken when in environment x.
Let us denote by g : S → X the simulator, that is, a function taking as
input a configuration s ∈ S of parameters, and returning the result of the sim-
ulation associated to these parameter values. A configuration s of parameters
contains all information needed by the simulator to generate a perceptual in-
put; each parameter may be a discrete or continuous variable. Let us take as
running example a simulator of autonomous car images: s would contain the
road characteristics, the number of pedestrians and their positions, the weather
conditions. . . , that is, potentially, thousands or millions of variables, depending
on the simulator realism.
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The problem to solve here is the following: For a model f trained on data
belonging to X generated by g to perform a certain task, how can we formulate
and formally verify practical safety properties for all possible x ∈ X , including
samples never seen during training?
3.3 Including the simulator in the verification
In standard settings, such as the ones schematized in Figure 1, specifications
express relationships from X to Y using a formulation of f . But X is such a huge
space that formulating properties that are non trivial, let alone verify these, is
prohibitively difficult, especially in the case of perceptive systems where the
domain of x cannot be specified: all matrices in
(
[0, 255]3
)#pixels
are images,
technically, but few of them make sense, and one cannot describe which ones.
Moreover, given an image x, the property to check might be difficult to express,
as, to state that all pedestrians were detected and avoided, one needs to know
whether there are pedestrians in x and where, which we do not know formally
from just the image x. And if one had a way to retrieve such information from
x (number and location of pedestrians) without any mistake, one would have
already solved the initial problem, i.e., safe self-driving car.
Figure 1: Natural inputs with huge perceptual space: no characterization of the input nor
property can be formulated.
To summarize, in this setting, it is impossible to express a relevant space for
x and a property to verify Φ:
∀x ∈ ?, Φ? ( f(x) )
In the setting of simulated inputs, though it remains difficult to formulate
properties on the perceptual space X , we know that this space is produced by
g applied to parameters in S. On the contrary to X , S is a space where there
exists an abstract, albeit simplistic characterization of entities. Indeed, setting
parameters for a pedestrian in the simulated input yields a specification of what
a pedestrian is in X according to the inner workings of g. The procedure g
transforms elements s ∈ S, that represent abstracted entities, into elements x ∈
X that describe these entities in the rich perceptual space. To output values
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in Y, f has to capture the inner semantics contained in X , that is to say, to
abstract back a part of S from X .
The above remark is the key to the proposed framework: If we include S
and g alongside f , X and Y in the verification problem, then all meaningful
elements of S are de facto included. It then becomes possible to formulate
interesting properties, such as “given a simulator that defines pedestrians as a
certain pattern of pixels, does a model trained on the images generated by this
simulator avoid all pedestrians correctly?”. Formally, to ensure that the output
y = p ◦ g(s) satisfies a property Φ for all examples x = g(s) that can ever be
generated by the simulator, the formula to check is of the form:
∀s ∈ S, Φ(s, p ◦ g(s) )
The property Φ may depend on s indeed, as, in our running example, s explicitly
contains the information about the number of pedestrians to be avoided as well
as their locations.
Figure 2: Generated inputs with integration of the generation procedure in the verification
problem. There are now new properties to check since we have a formal characteri-
zation of the perceptual elements.
Including S and g in a formal property to check requires to formulate at
least partially the multiple functions that compose g. Describing precisely these
procedures is a key problem that we plan to address later.
As our framework relies on including the simulator in the verification prob-
lem, we call it Certifying Autonomous deep Models Using Simulators (CAMUS).
3.4 Separating perception and reasoning
Before the rise of deep learning, the perception function (which, e.g., recog-
nizes a certain pattern of pixels as a pedestrian) and the control, or reasoning
function (which, e.g., analyzes the location of a pedestrian and proposes a deci-
sion accordingly) in vehicles were designed and optimized separately. However,
work such as [7] showed that end-to-end learning can in general be a much
more efficient alternative; there exist many incentives to adopt this end-to-end
architecture, mixing and training jointly the perception and control functions.
However, combining perception and reasoning into one model makes the formu-
lation of safety properties more difficult.
Thus in our description (see Fig. 3), we choose to separate the perception and
the reasoning functions, respectively in the components p and r. The perception
part p is in charge of capturing all relevant information contained in the image,
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while the reasoning part r will make use of this relevant information to output
directives accordingly to a specification.
One way to make sure that p retrieves all relevant information is to require
it to retrieve all information available, that is, to reconstruct the full simulator
parameter configuration s. In this setting, the output s′ of the perception
module p lies in the same space as the parameter configuration space S, and
the property we would like to be satisfy can be written as p ◦ g = Id, which can
be rewritten as:
∀s ∈ S, p ◦ g(s) = s (1)
This way, we ensure that the perception module p correctly perceives all samples
that could ever be generated by the simulator. In the case some parameters are
known not to be relevant (image noise, decoration details, etc.), one can choose
not to require to find them back, therefore asking to retrieve only the other
ones. For the sake of notation simplicity, we will here consider the case where
we ask to reconstruct all parameters.
This separation between perception p and further reasoning r brings mod-
ularity as an additional benefit: even when dealing with different traffic reg-
ulations, it is only necessary to prove p once; the verification of compliance
towards local legislations and specifications by r can be done separately. It al-
lows to reuse the complex perception unit with different reasoning modules r
without needing to re-prove it. Note also that r does not need to be as complex
as p, since it will work on much smaller spaces; multiple verifications of r are
then easier.
Figure 3: Integration of the generation procedure in the verification, with split between per-
ception and reasoning: p learns to capture all the relevant parameters; r learns to
respect the specification. Verifying φ1 proves the perception unit once and for all;
verifying φ2 can be done when the specification changes (e.g., for different driving
rules).
One could argue that this formulation makes the problem more complex,
and it indeed may be the case. However, our proposition is aimed at safety,
and in order to provide additional trust, it is sometimes necessary to formulate
the problem differently. For instance, there are good practices to structure
the code to provide some safety guarantees: bounded loops, correctly allocated
and de-allocated references, ban of function references, . . . are constructs that
voluntarily restrain the expressive power of the programming language to ensure
a safer behaviour. Hence, although this formulation might seem like a step back
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w.r.t. the state-of-the-art, we argue that it provides a new way to formulate
safety properties, and hence will be beneficial in the long run.
3.5 Properties Formulation
Considering jointly the simulator g and the ML model f , split in p and r, two
families of properties are amenable to formal checking:
• Φ1: perception unit p has captured sufficient knowledge from X ;
• Φ2: reasoning unit r respects a specification property regarding Y.
Type 2 properties have been addressed in the literature - see Section 2.2. The
key point of the proposed approach is thus to obtain a representation space
that reliably yields semantic meaning, which is the objective of Φ1. Since the
simulator is included in the verification problem, properties of family Φ1 can
be written as relationships between input parameter configurations s ∈ S and
retrieved parameter configurations s′ ∈ S, outputs of the perception module p.
Strict equality between s and s′ may be difficult to achieve, and is actually not
needed as long as the reasoning module r is able to deal with small estimation
errors.
Expressed in the proposed formalism, the perception task is equivalent to
finding (a good approximation of) S. Thus, a relaxed version of property 1 to
satisfy could be formalized as some tolerance ε > 0 on the reconstruction error
‖s′ − s‖ (for some metric ‖ · ‖):
∀s ∈ S, ‖s− p ◦ g(s)‖ 6 ε (2)
3.6 Discussion
As stated earlier, it is not always necessary to retrieve all parameters of config-
uration s. For instance, one could seek to retrieve only the correct number of
pedestrians and their locations, from any image generable by the simulator. In
this case, the output of p would be just a few coefficients of s, and must conse-
quently be characterized differently (e.g., as belonging to a given subspace of S).
This would allow to express more flexible properties than simply reconstruct all
parameters.
For the model f to correctly generalize, the simulated data must yield two
characteristics:
1. they need to be sufficiently realistic (that is to say, they should look like
real-world images); if not the network could overfit the simplistic repre-
sentation provided by the simulator;
2. they must be representative of the various cases the model has to take
into account, to cover sufficiently diverse situations.
Additional characterization of the simulator would be difficult. For instance,
one could suggest to require the simulator g to be either surjective or injective,
in order to cover all possible cases x ∈ X , or for parameters to be uniquely
retrievable. Yet, the largest part of the perceptual space X is usually made of
nonsensical cases (think of random images in
(
[0, 255]3
)#pixels
with each pixel
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color picked independently: most are just noise), and the subspace of plausible
perceptual inputs is generally not characterizable (without which the problem
at hand would already be solved). Regarding injectivity, being one-to-one is
actually not needed when dealing with properties such as 2.
Finally, let us consider the case where several simulators are available, and
where, given a perceptive system p, we would like to assert properties of type Φ1
for each of the simulators. At first glance, as the output of p consists of retrieved
parameters, this would seem to require that all simulators are parameterized
exactly identically (same S). However, for real tasks, one does not need to
retrieve all parameters but only the useful ones (e.g., number of pedestrians and
their locations), which necessarily appear in the configuration of all simulators.
As it is straightforward to build for each simulator a mapping from its full list
of parameters towards the few ones of interest, a shared space for retrieved
parameters can be defined, a unique perception system p can be trained, and
formal properties for all simulators can be expressed.
4 Translating neural networks into logical for-
mulae
In previous section, we introduced two families of properties: Φ1 involves the
simulator g, its parameter space S, the perceptual space X where simulated
data lie, and the perception unit p; Φ2 involves the representation space learned
by p (which should be a copy of S), the reasoning unit r and its output space
Y.
In order to be able to actually formulate properties of these families, we
must first be able to represent all these elements as logical formulae. The goal
of this section is to introduce ONNX2SMT, a tool to do so automatically.
ONNX2SMT provides an interface to all machine learning models that use
the Open Neural Network Exchange format [2], and translates them into the
standard language SMT-LIB[5], allowing all state-of-the-art generalist SMT
solvers and deep learning verification specialized tools to work on a direct tran-
scription of state-of-the-art neural networks. ONNX2SMT will be open-sourced
to further help the community effort towards safer deep learning software.
4.1 ONNX and SMT-LIB
The Open Neural Network eXchange format (ONNX)1 is a community initia-
tive kickstarted by Facebook and Microsoft, that aims to be an open format for
representing neural networks, compatible across multiple frameworks. It repre-
sents neural networks as directed acyclic graphs, each node of the graph being a
call to an operation. Common operations in machine learning and deep learning
are tensor multiplications, convolutions, activations functions, reshaping, etc. 2.
Operations have predecessors and successors, describing the flow of information
in the network. The network parameters are also stored in the ONNX graph.
A wide variety of deep learning frameworks support ONNX, including Caffe2,
PyTorch, Microsoft CNTK, MatLab, SciKit-Learn and TensorFlow. Examples
1https://onnx.ai/
2Full list of supported operators is available at:
https://github.com/onnx/onnx/blob/master/docs/Operators.md
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of use cases presented in the official page3 include benchmarking models com-
ing from different frameworks, converting a model prototyped using PyTorch to
Caffe2 and deploying it on embedded software.
SMT-LIB2 is a standard language used to describe logical formulae to be
solved using SMT solvers. Most state-of-the-art solvers implement a SMT-LIB
support, which facilitates benchmarks and comparisons between solvers. SMT-
COMP [4] is a yearly competition using SMT-LIB as its format. This challenge is
a unique opportunity to present different techniques used by solvers, to increase
the global knowledge of the SMT community. SMT-LIB2 supports expressing
formulae using bit vectors, Boolean operators, functional arrays, integers, float-
ing points and real numbers, as well as linear and non-linear arithmetic. In this
work, only the Quantifier-Free Non linear Real Arithmetic (QF NRA) theory
will be used. Since the language aims to be compatible with a wide variety of
solvers, expressivity is limited compared to languages such as Python, used by
most deep learning platforms. In particular, there is no built-in Tensor type,
and it is hence necessary to adapt the semantics of tensors to SMT-LIB2. This
adaptation is performed by ONNX2SMT.
4.2 Features
Features of ONNX2SMT include the support of the most common operations
in modern neural networks, such as tensors addition and multiplication, max-
pooling and convolution on 2D inputs. Support for a wider range of operators
(such as reshaping or renormalization operators) is on-going work.
ONNX2SMT uses a Neural IntErmediate Representation (NIER) to perform
modifications of the deep neural network structure, for instance by following
rewriting rules. NIER is still at an early stage, but future work will integrate
state of the art certified reasoning and pruning.
The conversion from ONNX to NIER is performed thanks to the reference
protobuf description of ONNX, converted to OCaml types using the piqi4 tool
suite. ONNX2SMT provides straightforward conversion from ONNX to SMT-
LIB, using NIER as an intermediate representation.
All the features described above allow us to encode machine learning models
(p and r) as SMT formulae. X and Y can be expressed directly using QF NRA
existing primitives. Future work will provide an additional mechanism to encode
g and S.
4.3 Usage
ONNX2SMT workflow can be summarized as follows:
Input: an ONNX file created using an ML framework;
1. Convert the ONNX model to NIER (onnx parser);
2. Convert NIER to a SMT-LIB (smtifyer) string, written on disk;
3. Add the property to validate to the existing SMT-LIB file;
Output: An SMT-LIB file that can be solved to prove the property.
3https://github.com/onnx/tutorials/
4https://github.com/alavrik/piqi
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5 Experiments
As a proof of concept for the proposed framework, it is applied it to a simple
synthetic problem. All experiments are conducted using the PyTorch framework
[31]. Neural networks are trained with PyTorch, then converted into ONNX
using the built-in ONNX converter and finally converted into the intermediate
representation in SMT-LIB format with ONNX2SMT. We use z3[13], CVC4[3],
YICES[16] and COLIBRI[28] SMT solvers as standard verification tools.
Let us consider here the perception unit of an autonomous vehicle, whose
goal is to output driving directives that result in safe driving behaviour. The
perception unit is modeled as a deep neural network with one output node,
taking as input an image. If an obstacle lies in a pre-defined “danger zone”,
the network should output a “change direction” directive. Otherwise, it should
output a “no change” directive.
The “simulator” is here a Python script, taking as input the number and
the locations on the image of the one-pixel wide obstacles and generating the
corresponding black-and-white images.
The verification problem consists in the formulation of the network structure
and constraints on the inputs, and in the following properties to check:
1. verify that an input with an obstacle (or several ones) in the danger zone
will always lead to the “change direction” directive;
2. verify that an input without obstacle on the danger zone will never lead
to the “change direction” directive.
If both properties are verified, our model is perfect for all the inputs that can
be generated. If the first one is not verified, our verification system will provide
examples of inputs where our model fails, which can be a useful insight on the
model flaws. Such examples could be used for further more robust training, i.e.,
integrated into a future training phase to correct the network misclassifications.
Similarly, if the second property is not verified, the solver will provide false
positives, that can help designers reduce erroneous alerts and make their tools
more acceptable for the end-user.
Experimental setting
In this toy example, input data are N ×N black-and-white images (see Fig. 4
for examples). The space of possible simulated data g(S) ⊂ X can simply be
described by the constraint that each pixel can only take two values (0 and 1). In
real life, data are much more complex, possibly continuous; such data can also
be handled in our framework, though experimenting with realistic simulators
is the topic of future work. The neural network is fully-connected with two
hidden layers. The number of neurons in the first and second hidden layers
are respectively one half and one quarter of the flattened size of the input. All
weights were initialized using Glorot optimization, with a gain of 1. The network
was trained with Adam optimizer for 2000 epochs, with batch size of 100, using
the binary cross entropy loss. The danger zone is defined as the bottom half
part of the image. Any image with at least one white pixel in this zone should
then yield a “change direction” directive.
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Figure 4: Example of inputs for the toy problem. White pixels represent obstacles. If they
are in the top half of the image, no alert should fire (first two exemples), while an
alert must fire if in the (dashed) bottom half of the image (last two examples). 9x9
picture is depicted here for clarity.
Here, constraints on inputs are encoded as statements on the SMT-LIB
variables. A fragment of property to check is presented on Figure 5. On such
a simple problem, the decomposition perception/reasoning is not needed, since
there exists a formal characterization of what an obstacle is.
Experiments results will come on later versions of the paper, and will addi-
tionaly be available at https://www.lri.fr/ gcharpia/camus/.
6 Discussion and perspectives
We introduced CAMUS, a formalism describing how to formally express safety
properties on functions taking simulated data as input. We also proposed
ONNX2SMT, a tool soon to be open sourced, that leverages two standards
used by the communities of formal methods and machine learning, to automat-
ically write machine learning algorithms as logical formulae. We demonstrated
the joint use of ONNX2SMT and CAMUS on a synthetic example mimicking a
self-driving car perceptive unit, as a proof of concept of our framework. This
toy example is of course still simplistic and much work on scalability is needed
before real self-driving car simulators can be incorporated into formal proofs.
Among future work, ONNX2SMT will be released and gain support for more
deep learning operations. While we provide a toolkit to translate neural net-
works directly in our framework, a way to easily represent a simulator is yet to
include. It is not an easy task, since the simulator must be describable with
sufficient granularity to allow the solver to use the simulator internal working to
simplify the verification problem. A scene description language with a modelling
language for simulators is a possible answer to these issues. Further theoretical
characterization of the simulator procedure and its link with the perceptive unit
will be undertaken, for instance to encompass stochastic processes. Besides, on
more complex simulators, programs and examples, the problem to verify will
remain computationally difficult. Various techniques to enhance solvers perfor-
mances will be developed and integrated in CAMUS, taking advantage of the
domain knowledge provided by the simulators parameters. Finally, our current
framework checks properties for all possible inputs, including anomalous ones
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;;;; Automatically generated part
;; Inputs declaration
(declare-fun |actual_input_0_0_0_8| () Real)
[ommitted for brevity]
;; Weights declaration
(declare-fun |l_1.weight_31_4| () Real)
(assert (= |l_1.weight_31_4| (/ -5585077 33554432)))
[ommitted for brevity]
;; An example of encoded calculation
(assert (= |8_0_0_0_39| (* |actual_input_0_0_0_8| (+ |7_80_39| (* |
actual_input_0_0_0_7| (+ |7_79_39| (* |actual_input_0_0_0_6| (+
|7_78_39| (* |actual_input_0_0_0_5|
[ommitted for brevity]
;; Outputs declaration
(assert (= |actual_output_0_0_0_1| ( + |16_0_0_0_1| |l_3.bias_1| )))
[ommitted for brevity]
;;;; Handmade annotations
;; Simulator description
;; Input space constraints: inputs between 0 and 1
(assert (or (= actual_input_0_0_0_8 0) (= actual_input_0_0_0_8 1.)))
[ommitted for brevity]
;; Property to check
;; At least one input in the danger zone is white
(assert
(or
(or (= actual_input_0_0_0_5 1.)
(= actual_input_0_0_0_6 1.))
(or (= actual_input_0_0_0_7 1.)
(= actual_input_0_0_0_8 1.))
[ommitted for brevity]
;; Formulate constraint on outputs:
;; Output is always higher than a
;; confidence value
;; Negation: output can fire lower than a
;; confidence value
(assert (< actual_output_0_0_0_1 actual_output_0_0_0_0))
Figure 5: A SMTLIB2 file describing our problem. First part is a full description of the
network, automatically produced by ONNX2SMT. Handmade annotations describe
the property to check; the goal is to find a counterexample.
such as adversarial attacks. A possible extension would be to identify “safe”
subspaces instead, where perception is guaranteed to be perfect, and “unsafe”
subspaces where failures may happen.
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